Dassault Aviation

Reference: pages 88-91.

Dassault Aviation is headed by a Chairman and CEO and a Chief Operating Officer (COO), both in their roles since 2013. The Board of Directors comprises the Chairman and CEO plus seven other non-executive Directors (including one Director representing employees), with a Central Economic and Social Committee representative invited to each meeting.

"Three women currently sit on the Board of Directors, out of a total of seven members (excluding the Director representing employees)," giving 43% women, above the 40% legal requirement. Three of seven Directors (43%) are independent. Directors are aged 49 to 87, averaging 67.

The CSR Manager, appointed by the Chairman and CEO, oversees CSR policy within the Total Quality Management Department (TQMD). Environmental standards (E1-E5) sit with TQMD, S1 with HR and the Ethics and Compliance Department (ECD), G1 with ECD/Purchasing/Finance, and S2-S4 are cross-functional. The Audit Committee monitors preparation and verification of sustainability information.

Reference: pages 92-93.

Information on material IROs is provided to Executive Management throughout the year "based on their criticality," covering CSR policy implementation, critical regulatory developments, stakeholder interactions, major risks and key performance indicators. The CSR policy rests on five pillars, including "improving the environmental performance of activities and products" and "offering an attractive and motivating employment model."

A CSR letter signed by the Chairman and CEO was circulated to all entities in 2025, focusing efforts on occupational health and safety, employment attractiveness, environmental performance and responsible purchasing. Progress on 2025 objectives was reported to Executive Management ahead of the July 2025 Board meeting and presented at the July and December 2025 TQMD management reviews. The double materiality assessment, first run in 2023 and updated in 2025, was presented to Executive Management.

Reference: page 93.

The compensation principles for the Chairman and CEO and the COO are set by the Board of Directors each year, with a fixed and a variable component (including performance shares). "10% of this variable compensation includes sustainability performance indicators, covering social and environmental aspects."

For 2025, the social metric is "the rate of female hires over the year (permanent and fixed-term contracts) at Dassault Aviation's French companies," and the environmental metric is "the reduction of Scopes 1 and 2 CO2 emissions, excluding kerosene, at the Parent Company, adjusted for equivalent production conditions."

Reference: pages 93-95.

Due diligence is defined as the process through which the Company "identifies, prevents and mitigates the actual and potential negative impacts of their activities on the environment and the populations affected by them, and reports on how they address these impacts."

The statement maps core due-diligence elements to specific sections: embedding in governance/strategy (GOV-2, GOV-3, SBM-3); engaging stakeholders (GOV-2, SBM-2, IRO-1, and topical policies E1-1, E1-2, E2-1, S1-1 to S1-3, S2, S4-1 to S4-3, G1-1, G1-2); identifying and assessing adverse impacts (SBM-3, IRO-1, S2); taking action (E1-1, E1-3, S1-4, S2, S4-4); and tracking effectiveness (E1-4 to E1-6, S1-14, S2, S4-5).

Reference: pages 94-95.

"The double materiality assessment was carried out with the departments that have a good understanding of the interests and views of stakeholders." Information produced in the sustainability statement "has been analyzed and verified by the various contributing departments and, ultimately, by a central team responsible for approving the annual report."

Sustainability information falls within the Company's existing risk management system, overseen by the Internal Audit and Risk Department (IARD), which quantifies risks by probability and impact across three criticality levels. The report states that "the risk...of failure to meet regulatory requirements for producing information is not considered a major risk," so it carries no dedicated controls or reporting to the governance bodies beyond the general system.

Reference: pages 94-100.

Dassault Aviation combines dual civil-military expertise. Since 1945 it has produced "5,900 military aircraft and 2,800 civil aircraft, for a total of 8,700 aircraft, 65% of which have been exported." 2025 revenue split Falcon 37%, Defense France 23%, Defense Export 40%.

Military activity (Rafale) is strictly state-controlled: export licenses require CIEEMG, SGDSN and DGA approval, and Dassault Aviation "has a manufacturing and trade authorization granted by the French Ministry of Armed Forces." Falcon business jets range 7,400-13,890 km. The value chain covers French/European/North American suppliers (around 400 undertakings for Rafale prime systems), Company design/production activities, and military and civil end-users; the Company supports "around 1,000 military aircraft and 2,150 Falcon jets in service in 90 countries." Sustainability matters span sovereignty, environment (climate, pollution, materials), social (talent, safety, diversity) and governance (ethics, suppliers, cyber).

Reference: pages 100-102.

The statement tables six stakeholder groups with their expectations and cooperation channels: Society (sovereignty, human rights, environmental risk control - via public hearings, codes of conduct, charitable support); Customers (product safety, environmental performance - via the Safety Management System, quality audits, certification); Employees (value sharing, attractiveness, diversity, health and safety - via union negotiations, occupational health services, onboarding); Shareholders and investors (financial performance, CSR commitments - via the AGM and investor meetings); Suppliers (equitable relationships, payment terms - via GIFAS commitment charters); and Public/administrative authorities (compliance, taxes - via declarations and audits). "Dassault Aviation's business model and strategy have remained stable with regard to stakeholders since the previous financial year."

Reference: pages 102-104.

The master IRO table lists impacts, risks and opportunities with time horizon, value-chain location and strategy. Sovereignty is a long-term positive impact and opportunity for France's defense. Material environmental issues: reduction in carbon footprint/energy consumption (negative impact, E1); climate change adaptation (risk, E1, newly added this year); industrial and pollution risk control (risk, E2, obsolescence linked to substance regulation); materials use and circular economy (risk, E5, non-availability of raw materials). Social issues (S1): attractiveness/talent retention and training/skills mismatch (risks); diversity, employee health and safety, and quality of life (negative impacts). New this year: "potential infringement of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of workers in the value chain" (negative impact, S2). Governance (G1): cyber risk for IT systems and breach of business ethics (risks); supplier relationships (positive impact). S4 covers aviation-accident impact and two safety risks. "All IROs are covered in this sustainability statement through the ESRS topics, except for Sovereignty...Cyber risk for IT systems is addressed in §4.4.7."

Reference: pages 104-105.

The double materiality assessment, first run for FY2024 with a consulting firm, "was updated in a targeted manner for financial year 2025." It covers the ESRS 1 issues plus voluntary analysis of cybersecurity and sovereignty. "Dassault Aviation did not interview any interested parties outside the Company"; views were represented through "an internal panel of experts recognized in their field" from TQMD, HRD, ECD, PD, FD, IARD and ED.

Impact severity uses scale, scope and irremediable character, each on a four-level scale (values 1-3-6-10), averaged arithmetically; likelihood is treated as certain for human-rights impacts. Risks and opportunities are scored on scale and likelihood. "IROs positioned in the BLUE zone are considered material under the CSRD." Changes versus 2024: addition of the impact on value-chain workers' human rights, addition of the climate-adaptation risk, and removal of the employee-health-and-safety risk.

Reference: pages 106-110.

Section 4.1.12 tables the Disclosure Requirements the statement covers, by ESRS chapter and section: ESRS 2 (GOV-1 to GOV-5, SBM-1 to SBM-3, IRO-1, IRO-2 at §4.1.1-4.1.12); E1 (E1-1 through E1-9, excluding no datapoint, at §4.2.2.1-4.2.2.11); E2 (E2-1, E2-2, E2-3, E2-5, E2-6 - E2-4 is not listed); E5 (E5-1 through E5-4 and E5-6 - E5-5 is not listed); S1 (S1-1 through S1-7, S1-9 through S1-17 - S1-8 is not listed); S2 (a single general entry, "Information about workers in the value chain (S2)," at §4.3.2); S4 (S4-1 through S4-5); and G1 (G1-1 through G1-6), plus an entity-specific cybersecurity statement at §4.4.7. A separate table (§4.1.12) lists datapoints derived from other EU legislation under ESRS 2 Appendix B. Material topical standards are E1, E2, E5, S1, S2 and S4, alongside ESRS 2 and G1; E3, E4 and S3 are absent from the index.

Reference: pages 114-115.

"Tackling climate change is a part of Dassault Aviation's Corporate Social Responsibility policy. Dassault Aviation is pursuing its continuous improvement approach and does not have a transition plan for climate change."

This is an explicit company statement, not an omission: the Company discloses that no formal ESRS-style transition plan exists, and that climate action instead proceeds through the ongoing CSR policy (energy efficiency, SAF, electrification, renewables) described under E1-2 and E1-3, and through the GOV-3 remuneration link to Scope 1/2 reduction.

Identification of climate-related risks and scenario analysis

Back-filled from ESRS 2 SBM-3 (the E1-specific §4.2.2.2) and IRO-1 (§4.1.11), where this content is disclosed in the FY2025 report (pages 105-106, 115). This disclosure requirement did not exist under the 2023 ESRS the report was prepared against.

Risk classified (¶15): the material climate IRO is a physical risk - "decline in productivity, partial or total interruption of production" - implicit in the SBM-3 IRO table; transition risk was assessed but found non-material.

Methodology (¶16): a 2023 physical-risk exposure study covered Company sites and a sample of suppliers, "cross-referenc[ing] the exposure of sites to the 28 climate hazards defined by the European Taxonomy." Scenario used (¶17(a)(i)): IPCC SSP5-8.5 (the high-emission scenario), analyzed over 2021-2040 and 2041-2060. No 1.5°C-aligned transition scenario was used (¶17(a)(ii)) because transition risk "is regarded...as non-material at present." Finding: short-to-medium-term (2025-2030), "tornadoes are the only hazard that could reduce productivity or partially interrupt production," concentrated at the Little Rock site; other high-impact hazards (heavy rainfall, flooding, forest fires, land subsidence) are managed via business continuity plans pending further analysis.

Resilience in relation to climate change

Back-filled from the E1-specific SBM-3 (§4.2.2.2) and the physical-risk adaptation discussion (§4.1.12), where this content is disclosed in the FY2025 report (pages 105-106, 115). This disclosure requirement did not exist under the 2023 ESRS the report was prepared against.

No formal ESRS-defined resilience analysis is described. The statement's closest equivalent is operational: for the high-impact hazards outside the identified tornado risk, "Dassault Aviation relies on its business continuity plans and will continue to study solutions to improve its analysis of vulnerability to identified hazards."

On adaptation specifically, the report states transition risk is non-material "at present" but that the Company "actively monitors this issue, which could lead to its materiality and assessment being updated," and "plans to update the assessments during the next financial year." No quantification of financial flexibility, asset redeployment capacity, or planned-investment resilience effect (AR 10) is given.

Reference: pages 115-117.

The CSR policy, signed by the Chairman and CEO and publicly available on the Company website, covers "Improve environmental performance of our activities and products," with the stated priority to "Reinforce the low-carbon Company plan consistent with climatic challenges." This is implemented via aircraft development programs, supplier/partner contracts, new processes and materials, infrastructure plans and customer support.

Named components detailed elsewhere in the statement: the energy saving plan (efficiency plus self-generated renewable energy), the French-company vehicle allocation policy, renewable-energy purchasing, the Quality of Life and Working Conditions Agreement (mobility), and the SAF plan. In July 2024 Dassault Aviation's CTO and six other aerospace CTOs (Airbus, Boeing, GE Aerospace, Rolls Royce, RTX, Safran) "reiterated their support for the 2050 net-zero target for the aviation sector."

Reference: pages 116-122.

ISO 14001-certified since 2007, covering "over 86% of the Company's global headcount" (Parent Company, Dassault Falcon Jet Little Rock, Dassault Falcon Service Le Bourget and Mérignac). Lifecycle studies show "aircraft use accounts for more than 95% of greenhouse gas emissions over the entire life cycle," and "the long service life of aircraft (potentially more than 30 years) means that life cycle constraints must be anticipated" at the design stage.

SAF plan: current flights use physical SAF, "mainly...with a 30% to 35% HEFA...blend," cutting the corresponding flight's carbon footprint "by about 24%-30%"; the Company targets 100% SAF-compatible aircraft in production by 2030, which "would reduce the carbon footprint by 80%." In 2025, "more than 194 flights were operated with SAF," cutting "more than 736 tCO2." Other 2025 actions: 23,754 m² of photovoltaic panels installed (plan reaching full potential by 2027); electric/hybrid vehicles reached "nearly 66% of" the Parent Company fleet (up from 45% in 2024).

Reference: pages 122-123.

Using 2019 as the base year (2020 excluded as Covid-distorted), the Company targets improvement in energy consumption, water consumption, air emissions and waste recovery, but: "With regard to Scopes 1 and 2 GHG emissions, Dassault Aviation has not set a measurable target in absolute terms for 2026." Instead it pursues efficiency improvements via energy efficiency, fuel switching, electrification and renewable energy use.

The E1-6 milestone table shows only qualitative progress ("Steadily improving") for 2026 and 2030, with no percentage reduction figure. Monitoring occurs through the GOV-3 carbon remuneration metric (Parent Company scope) and qualitative subsidiary reporting of energy data and actions.

Reference: pages 123-125.

Classified as a high-impact climate sector (NACE 3030Z). Total energy consumption fell from 401,723 MWh (2019) to 392,724 MWh (2024) to 365,351 MWh (2025), down 7% year on year. Fossil energy consumption fell to 237,741 MWh (65% of the mix, down from 68% in 2024); renewable consumption was 47,042 MWh (13% of the mix), including 43,844 MWh of purchased/acquired renewable electricity, heat, steam or cooling and 583 MWh of self-generated non-fuel renewables (up 129% year on year from a small base).

Energy intensity (high-impact-sector consumption per net sales) fell to 49.2 MWh/€m, down 22% from 2024's 62.9. Total consumption excluding kerosene rose 2% to 247,087 MWh.

Reference: pages 125-127.

"Dassault Aviation is not in a position to assess Scope 3 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to technical constraints that prevent it from obtaining reliable and sustainable results," so Scope 3 is not reported.

Gross Scope 1 fell to 47,938 tCO2eq in 2025 (from 54,050 in 2024, -11%; base year 2019: 57,829). Gross market-based Scope 2 fell to 8,275 tCO2eq (from 9,281, -11%; 2019: 23,236), while location-based Scope 2 was roughly flat at 21,226. Total market-based Scope 1+2 emissions fell to 56,213 tCO2eq (-11% year on year; 2019: 81,065). Excluding kerosene, market-based emissions fell 2% to 28,136 tCO2eq. GHG intensity (market-based, per net sales) fell to 7.6 tCO2eq/€m, down 25% from 2024. January-June 2025 French-site and Little Rock electricity was covered by Guarantees of Origin/RECs.

Reference: pages 126-127.

"Dassault Aviation did not undertake any GHG removal or mitigation projects in 2025." Since 2023 its contribution has been patronage of the Maubuisson forest project in Val-d'Oise: "the planting of a million trees of thirty different species on an abandoned plain," covering 1,340 ha and intended to benefit "a population of 100,000 people in seven neighboring communities" plus the wider Île-de-France region, "while helping to remove GHGs." Since 2024 the Company has been "actively monitoring the potential role of GHG removal projects," but has not committed to any carbon-credit-financed removals.

Reference: page 127.

"Internal carbon pricing has not been implemented in Dassault Aviation's processes." This is a nil return rather than a refusal to answer: the Company states that instead, "a qualitative approach at the Parent Company level that takes environmental criteria into account (including energy consumption and GHG emissions) has been adopted for projects involving changes to or the creation of industrial installations, machinery, activities or new production processes," i.e. no monetary shadow price, but a qualitative environmental screen on capital projects.

Reference: pages 128-129.

REACh and similar chemicals regulation "have a significant impact on aeronautics products and processes qualified to meet airworthiness and reliability requirements." The CSR policy sets priorities for regulatory compliance and environmental performance, aiming "to anticipate these constraints by working to replace carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic for reproduction (CMR) substances and the most problematic products (surface treatments, paints, sealants, adhesives, etc.)." Supplier contracts require accounting for substance regulation and managing obsolescence. The Company participates in industry discussions through GIFAS, ASD and the International Aerospace Environmental Group (IAEG).

Reference: pages 129-130.

Regulatory oversight has run "for more than 15 years," monitoring "a panel of approximately 5,000 substances" across REACh, Ozone-Depleting Substances, Persistent Organic Pollutants, F-Gas III, RoHS, biocides, PIC and CLP regimes. Substitution R&D targets "replacements for chromates in corrosion protection, terphenyl in sealants, bisphenol A in epoxy resins or adhesives, lead in electronics," with the PFAS restriction proposal to be folded into future substitution planning.

A dedicated unit has vetted new chemicals for "over ten years" before production/maintenance use. Process changes (mechanical rather than chemical machining, chromate removal, chromated-primer substitution) reduce chemical quantities used. Suppliers must disclose substance composition under REACH Article 33, and maintenance manuals flag substances (chromates, lead, cadmium, bisphenol A, terphenyl) in aircraft components.

Reference: page 130.

Substitution performance "is monitored using specific indicators," but the Company states it is "difficult to set commitments in terms of quantities substituted or substitution deadlines, given the complexity and duration of the necessary R&D processes in a changing regulatory environment." Explicitly, "Dassault Aviation does not set targets for the production, use or distribution of substances of concern and of very high concern," reasoning that such targets "do not correspond to the material risk of obsolescence related to substance regulations" and that "the precise quantity (mass) of substances present in a product is not usually available data." This is a reasoned, stated basis for having no quantitative target rather than a silent gap.

Reference: pages 130-131.

"With regard to the material risk of obsolescence linked to substance regulations, Dassault Aviation measures the effectiveness of its actions relating to the substitution of substances using progress metrics on the number of hazardous products substituted, in particular CMR products and those impacted by REACH." The Company "maintains a map of products containing substances classified as substances of very high concern that are in the process of being substituted, and informs its customers of their presence in the products delivered."

"Since 2013, 811 hazardous products have been removed, replaced or are being substituted." The statement notes these substitution metrics "do not measure the potential impact on pollution (non-material as specified in §4.1.11)" - a stated limitation rather than a silent gap.

Reference: pages 130-131.

The Purchasing Policy, updated at the start of 2025 by the Senior Executive Vice-President, Procurement and Purchasing, "aims in particular to secure its supply chain," applied across sectors. For raw materials specifically, "the Materials Centers allow us to 'serve our internal customers on time' (pillar 1 of the policy)." This policy is the Company's response to the single material E5 IRO: "the risk of non-availability of raw materials," identified in §4.1.10 as the only significant resource-use/circular-economy IRO.

Reference: pages 131-132.

Non-availability risk is monitored through supplier (structural assessment, contracts), technical (obsolescence oversight via CINPA, the Industrial Committee on Supply Unsustainability) and geopolitical (French Ministry of Armed Forces, GIFAS) channels, plus participation in OFREMI (French Observatory of Mineral Resources for Industrial Sectors).

When a risk is identified, responses include building inventories, sourcing new suppliers, and technical measures: "decrease in the buy-to-fly ratio," additive manufacturing, material redesign/switching (e.g. metal to composite), and "materials recovery and...circular economy relationships with suppliers."

Reference: page 132.

"A list of at-risk materials has been prepared and the main objective is to control their supply in order to secure production." This list derives from "internal analyses by Dassault Aviation and the joint work with the State." No quantified reduction or circularity target is given; the stated objective is supply security for identified at-risk materials rather than a measurable circular-economy target.

Reference: page 132.

"As indicated in Chapter §4.2.4.4, a list of at-risk materials has been identified but will not be detailed in this document as it contains strategic information whose disclosure would be detrimental to Dassault Aviation." The Company confirms it has identified specific inflow risks but withholds the material-level detail for confidentiality reasons consistent with the general confidentiality provision noted at BP-1 (ESRS 1 §7.7) - a stated reason for non-disclosure of the underlying data rather than a silent gap.

Reference: pages 134-136.

Policies cover attractiveness/retention (employer-brand communication, apprenticeship pipelines, a profit-sharing/incentive scheme benefiting "77.7% of Dassault Aviation's employees"), training and career management, diversity (company-level agreements on professional equality, disability employment, and staff-representative careers), and health and safety (the CSR policy pillar "Ensuring a high-quality, safe and healthy work environment").

On gender diversity, "the percentage of women hired...rose from 24.6% in 2024 to 27.8% in 2025." On human rights, the Company states it "has not identified any risk of forced or compulsory labor" and that "Dassault Aviation companies do not use child labor," backed by an Ethical Charter referencing the UN Global Compact (joined 2003) and Law No. 2017-399 on duty of care.

Reference: pages 136-137.

Trade unions "are present in all French subsidiaries and DFJ Do Brazil" and "cover 78% of the Company's workforce." In 2025, "20 agreements and amendments were signed by Dassault Aviation's French companies," covering wages, working time, gender equality, savings plans and profit-sharing, following the February 2022 branch collective bargaining agreement.

Dedicated bodies (the Economic and Social Committee and Health, Safety and Working Conditions Committee) hold scheduled meetings; in 2025 the Parent Company held "1,955" half-yearly manager check-in meetings introduced in 2022. Formalized anti-harassment procedures at the Parent Company and ExecuJet cover "75% of employees."

Reference: page 138.

Employees can raise concerns through their manager, HR, or staff representatives via social dialogue. The Parent Company runs a "participatory resolution process" in working-group settings, plus mediation (typically performed by HR) for disputes between employees. "When communication channels are not able to resolve and end disputes, employees can refer the matter to an outside third party" (courts, administrative bodies, defenders of rights). The same anti-harassment mechanisms noted under S1-2 apply, with regular reminder communications to employees about available channels.

Reference: pages 138-146.

Talent actions include student internships/work-study, VIE placements, GIFAS curriculum consultations, recruiter visits to schools, and retraining partnerships (188 people completed the 2025 metallurgy certification program, CQPM, with 180 certified). Onboarding included six "Journées Envol" welcoming "over 700 new hires" (97% satisfaction) and the Dassault Defense Academy.

Training actions use distance learning and tuition-assistance plans. Diversity actions track top-management gender mix and disability-employment agreements. Health/safety data is reported under S1-14. Quality-of-life actions follow the QLWC agreement (childcare, concierge services, sustainable mobility). On pay, French companies paid "more than EUR 34 million in 2025 (i.e. more than 5% of the payroll)" to the Economic and Social Committee for social/cultural activities.

Reference: pages 146-147.

"The Company does not have any targets that have been set for it as a whole, as each Dassault Aviation company has its specific objectives based on its own characteristics." This is a stated reason for the absence of a single group-wide workforce target (decentralization to each operating company), distinct from the gender-hiring "targets strengthened for all French companies" mentioned under S1-1, which are company-level rather than Company-wide.

Reference: pages 147-148.

Total headcount rose to 14,838 at end-2025 (from 14,589 at end-2024); including Dassault Reliance Aerospace Ltd (integrated September 2025), total headcount is 15,024. By entity: Parent Company 10,661 (up from 10,416); Dassault Falcon Jet 2,389; Dassault Falcon Service 564; ExecuJet 526; DABS 385; Sogitec 313.

By gender: 2,872 female / 11,966 male (2025), versus 2,779 / 11,810 (2024). By country: France 11,538, USA 2,348, rest of world 952 (2025).

Reference: pages 148-150.

Employees by age: under 30 - 2,234 (2025) vs 2,250 (2024); 30-50 - 7,834 vs 7,691; over 50 - 4,770 vs 4,648.

Gender distribution at top management: 12.9% female (38 of 295) in 2025, up from 10.9% (31 of 285) in 2024. Top management is defined, for French companies, as categories H16 and I of the February 7, 2022 metalworking collective bargaining agreement, and for foreign subsidiaries as the highest-responsibility executive roles. The report notes a FY2024 correction: pilots not covered by the metalworking agreement and without executive roles "were counted by mistake," raising the restated 2024 female rate from 10.3% to 10.9%.

Reference: page 150.

"All Company employees are paid an adequate wage, in line with applicable benchmarks under local law." This is a brief, direct compliance statement rather than a quantified wage-gap-to-benchmark figure; no percentage or absolute adequacy margin is disclosed.

Reference: page 150.

"At the end of 2025, Dassault Aviation employed 784 disabled workers (713 at end-2024), accounting for 5.3% (4.9% at end-2024) of its headcount." French companies exceed the statutory 6% quota: "Because this category accounts for 7.8% of their workforce, Dassault Aviation's French companies meet the statutory requirement according to which disabled people must make up at least 6% of the total" headcount.

Reference: pages 150-151.

Partial omission, with substantive data still given: under the same Article 7/Law 2025-391 derogation, the Company omits "the percentage of own workers covered by a health and safety management system for non-employees," "the number of work-related accidents for non-employees," "the number of occupational illnesses" and "the number of days lost."

What is disclosed: 100% of employees are covered by a health and safety management system (same as 2024). Work-related accidents (with or without lost time) rose to 300 in 2025 (from 265 in 2024); the frequency rate rose to 13.0 (from 11.9). Fatalities from work-related accidents were zero for employees, other on-site workers, and in total, in both 2024 and 2025. No occupational-illness-related deaths were identified "to the best of Dassault Aviation's knowledge."

Reference: pages 151-153.

"This gap is 5.3% for Dassault Aviation (5.9% in 2024)," calculated as "((average annual pay level of male employees) - (average annual pay level of female employees))/average gross annual pay level of male employees x 100." The report notes the calculation methodology changed versus the FY2024 statement (per BP-2, §4.1.2), and that the scope was limited to the Parent Company for 2024 data before being extended Company-wide from 2025.

Reference: pages 152-153.

Data comes from the Ethics and Compliance Department's "annual performance dashboard for whistleblowing reports." HR-related non-compliance reports (harassment, sexist behavior, discrimination) rose to 16 in 2025 (from 14 in 2024); human rights non-compliance reports were zero in both years. Total confirmed incidents were 3 in 2025 (not tracked/N/A in 2024). Fines, penalties and compensation for HR incidents/complaints, identified severe human-rights incidents, and total fines/penalties/compensation were all zero in both 2024 and 2025.

Reference: pages 154-155.

Dassault Aviation uses "customers" in place of "consumers and end-users," and the three material S4 IROs are the negative impact of an aviation accident, the risk of aircraft safety failure, and the risk of loss of airworthiness. Safety leadership was reiterated by the Chairman and CEO in a late-2024 letter. An independent Executive Aviation Safety Officer reports directly to the Chairman and CEO, supported by a Safety Management System (SMS) meeting ICAO Annex 19/SM-0001 standards and by certifications for civil and military design, production and maintenance. Certification activities comply with EASA Part 21 (Regulation (EU) No 748/2012) and are coordinated with EASA as lead certification authority.

Reference: page 155.

For accidents or serious incidents, any employee informed or witnessing must "immediately alert the Customer Service Department," and management of French-registered aircraft design/manufacture/maintenance entities must notify the technical investigation authority "as soon as they have knowledge of the event." "Only the technical investigation authorities are authorized to share details of the investigation and its progress" with involved parties (Dassault Aviation, EASA) and customers, and to make information public - Dassault Aviation does not itself control disclosure of investigation findings.

Reference: page 156.

Two parallel tracks apply depending on severity: a technical (safety) investigation, led by a government-appointed "lead investigator" with input from an Accident Management Committee (AMC) at Dassault Aviation that manages the crisis, liaises with the BEA, and defines corrective measures; and a judicial investigation to determine fault/liability and compensation, which is "under national law" and may run in parallel with, or take precedence over, the technical investigation. "Dassault Aviation does not define the remediation procedure" for the judicial track - that is a matter of national law in each jurisdiction.

Reference: pages 156-157.

The SMS covers design, production, operational support, maintenance and flight operations across the value chain. Actions include a "Just Culture" awareness plan (non-punitive incident reporting) - "By 2025, 40% of employees completed this training" - anonymous threat-reporting, and extension of safety requirements to suppliers: "In 2025, 84% of our suppliers committed to implementing our safety requirements." "In 2025, Dassault Aviation's SMS was declared compliant with EASA requirements." Certifications are monitored by the DGAC, EASA and FAA.

Reference: pages 157-158.

Following EASA's 2024 audit recommendations, 2025 goals were set to: train all employees in Safety/SMS (tracked via "weekly reporting on the number of employees who have completed this awareness training"); intensify Just Culture promotion via Safety Team interventions at each site; check supply-chain safety implementation among critical suppliers; and produce a summary of safety risks for the Company's most critical activities. Progress against the training target is given under S4-4 (40% completion by 2025).

Reference: pages 159-162.

Codes of conduct apply to employees, customers, partners, suppliers and subcontractors; the Company follows OECD and UN conventions, is a Global Compact signatory, and is a member of IFBEC, GIFAS and ASD. The Ethics and Compliance Department (ECD, created 2021) reports directly to the Chairman and CEO and runs anti-corruption/anti-money-laundering compliance, duty of care, export control, trade compliance, GDPR and AI governance, under Sapin 2 (Law No. 2016-1691) and the duty-of-care Law No. 2017-399.

A single internal whistleblowing system (Law No. 2022-401) covers corruption, serious human-rights breaches, worker-safety breaches and other offenses, with a 7-day acknowledgement and 3-month initial investigation update. "In financial year 2025, no acts of corruption or influence peddling were brought to the attention of the Ethics and Compliance Department." Supplier-contact training rose to 93% (2025) from 49% (2024); 4,850 employees completed Sapin 2 e-learning and 5,058 completed GDPR e-learning in 2025.

Reference: pages 162-163.

The Purchasing Policy, updated at the start of 2025 for a three-year period, is built on a five-part supplier structural assessment (financial health/social criteria, security, cyber-security, HSE/chemicals, and anti-corruption/human-rights compliance) in place since 2007, plus semi-annual monitoring. "The Parent Company carried out almost 400 structural analyses including 100% of new suppliers approved in 2025." Around 85% of Parent Company suppliers are French; support mechanisms include the GIFAS "Charter of commitment on customer and supplier relations" and the SME Defense Pact with the French Ministry of the Armed Forces (updated mid-2024).

Reference: pages 163-164.

Under Sapin 2, led by the Chairman and CEO's "zero-tolerance policy," the ECD maintains regularly-updated corruption/influence-peddling risk maps, an Anti-Corruption Code (updated 2024) and a new 2025 Supplier Code of Conduct, the single whistleblowing system, and risk-based training. "Throughout the 2025 financial year, the Ethics and Compliance Department performed level 2 controls on: procedures for evaluating suppliers, first-tier subcontractors, civil aircraft customers and consultants; expense reports...gifts...sponsorship and patronage operations; and internal investigations." These controls "confirmed that evaluation procedures covering the Sapin 2 Law had been put in place and were working."

Targets related to business conduct

Back-filled from the business conduct chapter (§4.4.1-4.4.3), where effectiveness tracking substitutes for a numbered target. G1-3 became a standalone DR only in the 2025/2026 ESRS; under the 2023 ESRS it fell under MDR-T.

No outcome-oriented business conduct target is stated. Consistent with MDR-T's alternative limb, effectiveness is tracked in the absence of one: the G1-1 training table reports supplier-contact staff trained "at risk" rising from 49% (2024) to 93% (2025), and customer-contact staff from 74% to 77%. Under G1-3, the ECD's 2025 "level 2 controls" program reviewed supplier/subcontractor/customer evaluation procedures, expense reports, gifts, sponsorship and internal investigations, and "confirmed that evaluation procedures covering the Sapin 2 Law had been put in place and were working" - a periodic compliance-assessment mechanism tracking effectiveness rather than a measurable target.

Reference: page 165.

"The Company has not been convicted of any offense." This is a direct nil return for FY2025, consistent with the G1-1 statement that no acts of corruption or influence peddling were brought to the ECD's attention and no related fines were imposed.

Reference: page 165.

Dassault Aviation reports its lobbying activity "to the National Digital Register of Lobbyists," maintained by HATVP, to raise awareness of aerospace and export issues among public actors; the register is publicly available. The Company belongs to several professional bodies (Cercle de l'Industrie, CIGREF, GIFAS, MEDEF International, UIMM, AFEP, France Industries, IAEG, EBAA, ASD) that summarize industry positions in papers sent to authorities. "The only people who engage in lobbying activities for the Company are clearly designated by its Executive Management," and patronage/sponsorship is subject to a dedicated ECD-monitored procedure.

Reference: pages 165-166.

French companies apply a standard "end of month + 45 days" statutory term. "For the 2025 financial year, the average payment period was 52 days (compared to 54 days in 2024), with nearly 92% of invoices being paid on time (compared to 88% in 2024)." For SMEs, the Parent Company "pays SME invoices within an average of 46 days (compared to 48 days in 2024), with nearly 96% of these invoices being paid on time (compared to 95% in 2024)." "There are no ongoing legal proceedings relating to late payments." The payment-period calculation methodology changed versus FY2024 (noted at BP-2).